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📁 Decision & risk |
⚡ Dispute resolution, governance |
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📖 Advanced / philosophical |
⏱️ 17 min read |
Table of contents
- 1. The paradox of truth
- 2. The conflict of truths
- 2.1 The collision of professional rationalities
- 2.2 The trap of mistaking evidence for reality
- 2.3 Perspective, interpretation, and cultural blind spots
- 3. The tragic nature of judgment: phronesis and the limits of rules
- 3.1 The collision of legitimate duties
- 3.2 Aristotle’s phronesis as a discipline of perception
- 3.3 The unavoidable cost of action
- 4. The invisible boundary
- 4.1 Recognizing when a principle turns against its purpose
- 4.2 Expertise, artificial intelligence and the limits of calculation
- 5. The burden of judgment
- 6. The concepts behind the argument
- 6.1 Five concepts to retain
- 6.2 Questions to carry into practice
- 6.3 In dialogue with the corpus
- 6.4 Concepts added to the lexicon
1. The paradox of truth
“What if winning a lawsuit meant the death of your project? Reflections on the impasse of legal formalism and the necessity of decisional wisdom.”
1.1 The protective promise of truth
Every civilisation rests upon a conviction so fundamental that it rarely becomes an object of thought: truth protects. Without it, contracts would lose their force, justice its legitimacy, trust its very possibility. No institution could endure without the shared belief that what is true can, in time, be established.
We therefore tend to regard the pursuit of truth as intrinsically protective. To establish what happened, to determine responsibility, to apply rules faithfully: these appear not merely useful, but necessary conditions of justice.
1.2 When truth defeats its purpose
Yet there are circumstances in which the pursuit of truth, carried to its logical conclusion, contributes to the destruction of precisely what truth was meant to preserve.
This is not simply a conflict between truth and falsehood, nor between justice and injustice. It is more troubling than that. The difficulty arises when two legitimate demands turn against one another: the demand to establish what is true and uphold what is right, and the demand to preserve the concrete conditions that make those principles worth upholding.
If principles derive part of their legitimacy from the goods they are meant to protect, what happens when their faithful application begins to destroy those goods?
To see the paradox clearly, one must leave abstraction for the places where decisions acquire weight.
1.3 A project lost despite legal victory
Picture the boardroom of a major international project owner. The dispute has just been decided: after four years of proceedings, the arbitral tribunal awards fifteen million euros in damages. Liability has been established with remarkable precision.
Thousands of kilometres away, however, a strategic viaduct remains unfinished. Construction has been suspended for three years. The cranes stand idle. The local subsidiary has entered insolvency after exhausting its cash reserves.
Legal truth has prevailed. The project has died.
1.4 The limits of a single rationality
Such a scene would hardly be exceptional. Nor would it necessarily reveal a simple failure of project management or contractual governance. It would expose something deeper: the coexistence of several forms of rationality, each coherent within its own domain, which collide the moment they are called upon to guide a single course of action.
I will call this an ecology of rationalities.
This expression designates the conditions under which several ways of understanding reality, each internally coherent, become mutually incompatible when confronted with the practical necessity of judgment. The difficulty is not that one of these rationalities is necessarily wrong. It is that each reveals something real while remaining structurally incapable of revealing the whole.
The problem, then, is not simply which rationality is correct.
It is what happens when correctness within one domain becomes destructive when applied to the whole.
To understand how this happens, we must first examine the rationalities through which people establish what is true, and why their respective claims cannot simply be collapsed into one another.
2. The conflict of truths
The first difficulty is deceptively simple.
Why should we ever hesitate to let truth, principle, and procedure prevail?
The answer is that without them, the alternative is not wisdom. It is arbitrariness.
2.1 The collision of professional rationalities
2.1.1 Different standards of truth
For the engineer, truth is material: what allows a structure to withstand physical forces.
For the lawyer, truth is procedural: what can be established through an adversarial process, according to the rules governing evidence.
For the financial professional, truth is expressed through value, solvency, and liquidity.
For the executive, truth takes on a more existential character. It concerns what allows a decision to be owned before shareholders, employees, partners, and, ultimately, the future of the organisation itself.
None of these perspectives is absurd. Each illuminates something real.
Indeed, each is indispensable.
A contract cannot retain authority if breaches are excused whenever circumstances become difficult. A legal system cannot preserve legitimacy if evidence is subordinated to intuition. An organisation cannot remain solvent by treating every future possibility as more important than present financial reality. A structure cannot be kept alive by managerial optimism when the physical conditions for its survival no longer exist.
The rule therefore deserves its authority.
So does evidence. So does expertise. So does accountability.
2.1.2 The limits of professional expertise
The first temptation would be to conclude that the solution is simply to determine which of these forms of rationality has the strongest claim to truth.
But this already conceals the difficulty.
Disciplines do not ask the same question when they ask what is true.
A legal ruling may establish liability. It does not thereby determine what should happen to the project as a whole.
A financial statement may establish insolvency. It does not thereby determine what the organisation ought to sacrifice in response.
An engineering assessment may establish that a structure is unsafe. It does not, by itself, determine which interests should bear the consequences of shutting it down.
Expertise produces reliable answers within an established frame. It does not necessarily tell us whether that frame contains the decision that now has to be made.
2.2 The trap of mistaking evidence for reality
The problem becomes sharper once evidence itself is mistaken for reality.
2.2.1 Procedural truth and historical reality
An arbitral tribunal does not recover the full historical truth of a complex project. It establishes what can be determined within a particular procedure, from the traces that have survived, been selected, produced, and admitted.
A ruling may establish a legally authoritative account of what happened without exhausting everything that happened. Confusing the two would turn the limits of the procedure into the limits of reality. An organisation that makes this confusion stops looking for what the procedure could not see.
2.2.2 The interpretive construction of facts
Truth, moreover, never arrives entirely naked. It comes through documents, witnesses, expert reports, memories, and narratives. Someone has always selected the material, framed it, ordered it, and given it meaning.
This does not make truth arbitrary. It makes the conditions of its appearance part of the inquiry itself, rather than merely a procedural flaw to be lamented.
Paul Ricœur makes this distinction central to his account of narrative: facts can be established, yet interpretation begins as soon as they are arranged into an intelligible account. There is no contradiction in saying that facts are true and that their presentation is constructed. The two belong to different levels.
The decision-maker who forgets this does not become more objective by relying on the account handed to him. He simply becomes blind to his own position as a reader.
2.3 Perspective, interpretation, and cultural blind spots
2.3.1 The cultural conditions of evidence
The same difficulty runs across legal cultures. What an arbitrator trained in English common law regards as persuasive evidence may not carry the same weight for a jurist formed within the OHADA tradition. The difference need not come from incompetence or bad faith. It can arise from different conceptions of what makes testimony credible, what constitutes sufficient proof, and what a community considers relevant to the resolution of a dispute.
2.3.2 Recognising perspective without abandoning truth
The danger does not lie in having a point of view. It lies in forgetting that one has one.
An expert who mistakes his own framework for neutrality becomes less objective precisely because he believes himself objective. Some of the most persistent forms of injustice arise this way, without malice, from competence operating inside a frame it no longer thinks to examine.
And yet this critique of perspective does not abolish the authority of truth.
That would be the wrong conclusion.
The fact that every form of inquiry has limits does not mean that all accounts are equally valid. The existence of interpretation does not dissolve the distinction between truth and falsehood. The existence of competing rationalities does not give us permission to choose whichever reality best serves our interests.
If anything, the opposite is true.
The more we recognise the limits of any single rationality, the greater the responsibility to preserve the integrity of each one.
This is where the difficulty becomes genuinely tragic.
3. The tragic nature of judgment: phronesis and the limits of rules
The conflict would be easier to resolve if it opposed right to wrong, honesty to deceit, competence to incompetence.
Serious disputes are almost always harder than that.
3.1 The collision of legitimate duties
They arise from the collision of duties, each of which can claim a legitimacy of its own.
3.1.1 The legitimacy of competing goods
There is the duty of justice. A contract would mean little if breaches could simply be forgiven whenever circumstances grew difficult. An organisation that surrendered every claim in the name of pragmatism would eventually teach its partners that commitments are negotiable. The rule would lose its authority through its own abandonment.
There is, however, another duty.
Collective action requires conditions under which people can continue to act together. A project that survives only on paper while litigation consumes its cash flow, fractures its supply chain, and paralyses its management may satisfy the rule while destroying the very reason the rule exists.
The contradiction is therefore not between a good principle and a bad consequence.
It is a tragic conflict between goods that remain legitimate even when they cannot all be preserved.
This tension resists any simple hierarchy. There is no meta-rule that would settle, in general, the conflict between principle and consequence.
3.1.2 Why principles and consequences cannot be separated
The real question is more difficult:
Can a rule tell us, from within itself, that its own application has ceased to serve the purpose for which it exists?
No rule can answer that question about itself.
This is precisely where judgment begins.
One could oppose an ethics of principles to an ethics of consequences and imagine that the decision-maker need only choose between them. Such a choice would simplify the dilemma at the price of misunderstanding it.
A principle without regard for consequences hardens into formalism. Consequences without principles dissolve into opportunism.
Neither amounts to wisdom.
3.2 Aristotle’s phronesis as a discipline of perception
3.2.1 Beyond the balance between principle and consequence
Here it is worth guarding against a common misreading of Aristotelian phronesis. It is often presented as a simple mediation, a prudent way of balancing principle and consequence, an elegant compromise between two excesses. This reading is too weak. It reduces phronesis to a technique of balancing, when it is something else: a discipline of perception.
Phronesis does not answer the question “what should be done?” by offering a third option between rule and utility. It begins earlier, at a point the other two rationalities pass through without noticing: the moment when the singular situation must first be perceived correctly, before one can even know which rationality it calls for.
3.2.2 Learning to perceive the particular
Aristotle speaks here of perception (aisthēsis) rather than calculation. The practically wise person is not someone who possesses a superior method of deciding. It is someone who has learned to see, in the particular, what the particular actually contains, without forcing it into a category already prepared for it.
3.2.3 Why practical wisdom cannot be reduced to a procedure
This is why phronesis cannot be turned into a procedure. A procedure applies from the outside to cases it treats as equivalent. Phronesis is formed instead through repeated contact with situations that never quite resemble one another. What Aristotle calls experience is not an accumulation of solved cases, but a progressive refinement of the capacity to discern what, in a new situation, deserves attention.
This, then, is the proposition I want to hold to: responsible judgment consists neither in the perfect application of a rule nor in the perfect optimisation of consequences. It consists in discerning, within a singular situation, what each rationality allows one to see, what it necessarily leaves in shadow, and what the decision risks destroying by privileging one rationality over the others.
Phronesis is therefore less an answer than a discipline, the discipline of holding simultaneously in view the rule, the consequences, the time available, the people concerned, and the purpose being pursued, without letting any one of these dimensions silently absorb the rest.
3.3 The unavoidable cost of action
This discipline comes at a cost.
3.3.1 The remainder of every decision
It never delivers full certainty, since holding several requirements together means none can be satisfied without remainder. Serious decisions almost always leave a remainder.
Something valuable is sacrificed so that something else may survive. Justice rarely appears in the reassuring form of complete preservation. It requires instead the acceptance of an unavoidable loss, and the willingness to answer for it.
3.3.2 Preserving action while truth remains unsettled
This explains the value of institutions designed to preserve movement while the final truth remains unsettled. In major infrastructure projects, Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards can issue decisions while construction continues. Their role is not to establish the last word on every legal question. It is to prevent the project from collapsing while those questions remain open.
3.3.3 Time as a dimension of judgment
There is wisdom in such an arrangement, not because provisional truth is preferable to truth, but because a decision takes place in time, and time itself becomes one of the facts that judgment must account for.
Wisdom may consist, in part, in knowing which uncertainty a community can still afford to carry.
4. The invisible boundary
If practical wisdom cannot be reduced to a method of balancing competing claims, the question becomes more fundamental: how does one recognise the moment when a principle, faithfully applied, begins to defeat its own purpose?
4.1 Recognizing when a principle turns against its purpose
4.1.1 The moment a principle becomes self-defeating
It lies in recognising a moment: the moment when a principle, faithfully applied, begins to produce the opposite of what once justified it.
Such a boundary almost never announces itself.
No clause identifies it. No procedure necessarily reveals it. An algorithm can calculate consequences, but calculation alone does not say what deserves to be preserved.
What deserves to be preserved is not simply a given of the problem.
It is precisely what judgment must establish.
4.1.2 When the framework itself becomes the question
Expertise seeks reliable answers within an established framework.
Judgment begins when the framework itself becomes part of the question.
The engineer asks whether the structure can stand. The lawyer asks whether liability has been established. The accountant asks whether value has been preserved. The executive asks whether the organisation can survive.
All four questions matter.
None contains the whole decision.
4.1.3 Holding competing rationalities in conversation
The task, then, is not to choose one rationality and silence the others. It is to keep them in conversation long enough for their contradictions to become visible, without ever letting one of them claim absolute authority.
This is active work, not passive tolerance of differing viewpoints. It requires someone who refuses the comfort of deciding too soon, while knowing that a decision will eventually have to be made.
4.2 Expertise, artificial intelligence and the limits of calculation
This task grows harder as information becomes easier to produce.
4.2.1 The expansion of analytical capacity
Artificial intelligence can reconstruct facts faster than any human being. It can identify precedents, compare documents, and detect inconsistencies with extraordinary precision. The volume of material available to a tribunal, a mediator, or an executive will soon cease to be a practical limit.
4.2.2 What calculation cannot determine
Another limit will then become more important, one that no machine can lift on behalf of the human being who must decide:
What deserves attention? What matters? What should be preserved?
These questions belong to another order. They concern interpretation and responsibility. They require someone willing to decide while knowing that the justification can never be complete.
4.2.3 The limits of certainty and the return of responsibility
We often imagine wisdom as a form of superior certainty.
The opposite may be closer to the truth.
The wiser decision-maker is not necessarily the one who knows more. It is the one who knows what certainty cannot contain, and who acts anyway.
Such a person recognises that every important decision leaves something unresolved. Every judgment protects one value while exposing another. Every act of justice contains an element of renunciation.
This does not diminish responsibility.
It may be what responsibility means.
The temptation to escape judgment remains powerful. One can hide behind procedure, numbers, expertise, or moral conviction. Each offers shelter from uncertainty. Each can also become a way of avoiding the responsibility of deciding.
The deepest form of prudence begins here: not in possessing the truth, but in remaining worthy of the responsibility that truth places upon the person who must act.
What remains, then, is the recognition of what truth leaves to judgment.
5. The burden of judgment
Truth remains indispensable.
Without it, contracts would lose their meaning, institutions their legitimacy, trust its foundation.
5.1 What truth cannot decide
But truth alone cannot say what ought to follow from what has happened.
Between the past and the future lies a space that evidence cannot occupy by itself.
That space is practical judgment.
It is there that the weight of responsibility appears, not in establishing facts, not in applying rules, but in accepting that facts and rules can guide a decision without ever being able to make it for us.
This may be the condition shared by every serious act of judgment: to recognise that several legitimate goods can collide, and that no decision can preserve them all.
5.2 Between cynical calculation and rigid formalism
The choice then lies between two temptations.
One is cynical calculation, in which consequences become an excuse for abandoning principle.
The other is rigid formalism, in which fidelity to principle becomes an excuse for refusing to see its consequences.
5.3 The responsibility to act without complete certainty
Wisdom lies elsewhere, in a place harder to hold.
To see both.
To accept the loss that remains.
To act nonetheless, not because certainty has arrived, but because waiting for certainty would itself be a decision. And sometimes it would be the most destructive one.
5.4 The questions that lead to Sapientia
The essays that follow will return to this same terrain from different directions. Can impartiality ever be complete? Does greater expertise necessarily produce better judgment? Can objectivity be more than an aspiration? What place should doubt occupy in responsible decision-making?
These questions belong to different disciplines. Yet I believe they converge upon a single concern.
Not simply: how does one decide well?
But: what kind of person can bear responsibility for a decision that no rule can fully justify?
Perhaps that is where the heart of Sapientia lies.
The argument developed here rests on a number of distinctions that are worth making explicit, not as a method to be applied mechanically, but as concepts to carry into further reflection.
6. The concepts behind the argument
6.1 Six concepts to retain
Phronesis — practical wisdom
The capacity to deliberate well about what should be done in particular circumstances. Practical wisdom does not merely apply general principles; it discerns what matters in a singular situation and how competing considerations should bear on judgment.
Ecology of rationalities
A conceptual lens developed in this essay to examine how different forms of rationality—legal, technical, economic, ethical or relational—can each be internally coherent while producing conflicting demands. No single perspective necessarily captures the full meaning of a situation.
Practical judgment
The act of determining what ought to be done when general rules, available evidence and competing purposes do not yield an unambiguous answer. It requires more than analytical correctness: it requires discernment of the particular circumstances in which a decision must be made.
Impartiality
The discipline of resisting premature allegiance to a party, a perspective or a preferred outcome. Impartiality does not eliminate judgment; it seeks to prevent judgment from being captured by interests, assumptions or the unexamined authority of a single framework.
Tragic conflict
A situation in which legitimate principles or goods come into conflict, so that preserving one may entail the loss or impairment of another. Such conflicts cannot always be resolved without remainder. Judgment must therefore recognise not only what it preserves, but also what its decision sacrifices.
Responsibility of Judgment
The obligation to answer for a decision and its consequences when rules, evidence and methods cannot determine the outcome or remove the need to choose.
6.2 Questions to carry into practice
When a decision appears rational, ask:
- Rational according to which logic? What does each perspective make visible, and what does it leave outside its field of attention?
- What purpose does the principle serve? Does its application protect that purpose in this particular situation, or does it risk turning the principle against the very good it was meant to preserve?
- What must the decision-maker ultimately assume responsibility for? Not only the rule applied or the conclusion reached, but also the consequences that could not be avoided.
These questions do not provide a formula for deciding. They help reveal what a formula alone cannot settle.
6.3 In dialogue with the corpus
This essay brings several concepts into relation:
- Truth and evidence — what can be established, and what the available evidence allows us to conclude.
- Objectivity and impartiality — the distinction between the quality of an assessment and the posture of the person making it.
- Rationality and practical judgment — the difference between reasoning coherently within a framework and discerning what should be done in a particular situation.
- Responsibility of Judgment — the obligation to account for a decision when no rule or method can remove the need to choose.
These concepts are not interchangeable. Their distinctions matter precisely when a dispute or decision becomes difficult to resolve.
6.4 Concepts added to the lexicon
Phronesis · Practical judgment · Ecology of rationalities · Tragic conflict · Responsibility of Judgment